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Short-term Trading in Long-
term Funds: Implications for 
Financial Managers
For large hospitality firms, selecting professional investment managers for their retirement plans is a critical financial decision. Whether the plans are defined benefit or defined contribution, the financial manager’s goal is the same: to select a portfolio manager or managers who provide good returns relative to the degree of  risk they take on. Retirement funds are typically 
considered long-term, yet this study shows that pension fund managers and other money managers do a lot 
of  short-term trading. In fact, pension fund managers hold some 18 percent of  their round-trip trades for less 
than three months—and this research shows that most of  these short-term trades lose money. The evidence 
is consistent with the idea that the fund managers are trading just to appear active. This suggests that financial 
managers must look beyond basic fund turnover statistics for a true picture of  a portfolio manager’s investing 
style and skill.
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Short-term Trading in Long-term Funds: 
Implications for Hospitality Financial 
By Pamela C. Moulton
Most hospitality firms do not consider managing stock portfolios to be a main part of  their operations. They are in the service business, using their real assets and the services provided by employees to create valuable experiences for guests. However, the need to focus on stock investments arises through those employees. Employees 
consistently rank benefits, including retirement benefits, among the top five contributors to job satisfaction 
and as a key consideration in accepting a job.1 It is not surprising, then, that more than 90 percent of  
companies with 500 or more employees offer retirement plans. The five largest hotel companies in the U.S. 
have over $10 billion in assets under management in their retirement plans, making these plans a key 
component in retirement investment decisions.
1 See: Employee Job Satisfaction and Engagement 2014, Society for Human Resource Management, May 2014, and Bank of  America Merrill Lynch 
Workplace Benefit Report, June 11, 2012.
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identifier for the fund within an institution (such as Fidelity Ma-
gellan or Fidelity Equity Income fund); the transaction direction 
(buy or sell); the volume of  shares transacted; and the transac-
tion price. All institution and fund identifiers are expressed as 
numbers, so we can identify all the transactions executed by the 
same institution or the same fund, but we cannot determine the 
identity of  the institution or fund. Moreover, we see only trans-
actions, not the fund’s entire holdings.
A round-trip trade for a stock is defined as a purchase and 
a sale of  the same number of  shares of  the same stock in the 
same fund. These trades are identified using a first-in, first-out 
(FIFO) method.2 We assembled a chronological queue of  the 
transaction information for each combination of  symbol, insti-
tution, and fund. When a transaction in the opposite direction 
enters the queue, we match it with the earliest transaction in 
the queue. The number of  trading days between the buy and 
sell transactions is the holding period of  the round-trip trade. 
The size of  the round-trip trade is determined as the number 
of  shares bought and sold. For example, if  a manager buys 500 
shares on January 10, then sells 300 shares on February 10 and 
the remaining 200 shares on July 10 (all in the same stock), that 
is considered a one-month round-trip trade of  300 shares and 
a six-month round-trip trade of  200 shares. The sample period 
is from January 1, 1999, through December 31, 2009. Exhibit 1 
provides a first look at the dataset.
2 Using a last-in/first-out (LIFO) methodology yields qualitatively 
similar results except that a greater percentage of  trades are classified as short-
term. See: Bidisha Chakrabarty, Pamela C. Moulton, and Charles Trzcinka, 
“The Performance of  Short-term Institutional Trades,” forthcoming in the 
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis.
Retirement plans fall into two categories: traditional de-
fined benefit plans (in which the company bears the investment 
risk) and the now more common defined contribution plans 
(in which employees bear the investment risk). Companies may 
choose investment managers directly or, in the case of  defined 
contribution plans, create a list of  investment managers from 
which employees can select where to invest their money and 
the company’s contributions. This report examines the invest-
ment performance of  more than 1,000 professional investment 
managers and provides insight into the behavior of  institutional 
investors, using a detailed transaction-level dataset to evaluate 
the performance of  short-term trades in what are typically long-
term portfolios.
Sample and Methodology
We obtained the dataset that provides a detailed look into the 
activity of  a large number of  institutional traders from Ancerno 
Ltd., a consulting firm that monitors trading costs for institu-
tional clients. Ancerno collects detailed transaction information 
for all equity transactions executed by its clients, which include 
pension funds (such as CALPERS, the Commonwealth of  
Virginia, and the YMCA retirement fund) and money managers 
(such as Massachusetts Financial Services, Putnam Investments, 
and Fidelity). Ancerno does not reveal the names of  the clients 
whose trades are captured in this dataset, but their clients in-
clude many large and well-known money managers and pension 
funds. This dataset covers about 10 percent of  all institutional 
trading activity.
The database includes the following information for each 
transaction: the stock ticker symbol; the transaction date; an 
identifier for the institution (such as Fidelity or Putnam); an 
Full Sample Funds Present 5 or More Years
Number of funds 4,053 1,186
     Pension funds 3,811 1,102
     Money managers 242 84
Total share volume of round-trip trades (billion) 328.41 291.13
     Pension funds 30.07 18.83
     Money managers 298.34 272.30
Total dollar volume of round-trip trades ($ trillion) 10.8 8.94
     Pension funds 0.91 0.55
     Money managers 9.17 8.39
Total number of round-trip trades (million) 121.03 105.59
     Pension funds 9.51 6.25
     Money managers 111.52 99.33
Total number of stocks traded 9,737 9,407
Exhibit 1
Round-trip trade dataset
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One concern when analyzing trade holding periods is 
whether the proportion of  short-duration trades is unduly 
influenced by the presence of  funds that remain active for only a 
short period. For example, we cannot observe round-trip trades 
longer than one year for a fund that is in the dataset for only 
one year. Of  the 4,053 unique funds appearing between 1999 
and 2009, 1,059 are present for one year or less, and 1,186 are 
present for five or more years. Exhibit 1 provides statistics for 
both the full sample and the subsample of  1,186 funds that are 
present for at least five years. This report presents results only 
for the funds present for at least five years.
The full sample includes more than 328 billion shares and 
some $10 trillion in round-trip trades. Only 29 percent of  the 
funds in Ancerno are present for five or more years, but they 
account for 88 percent of  the share volume and dollar volume 
in the full sample. These long-lived funds also trade over 96 
percent of  the stocks traded in the full sample. In both the full 
sample and the subsample of  funds held five or more years, 
the majority of  the funds are pension funds, but most trading 
is done by money managers. Among the funds present five or 
more years, money managers represent only 7 percent of  the 
funds but account for over 93 percent of  the share volume 
traded.
Findings
Institutional investors do a lot of  short-term trading, as more 
than 23 percent of  the round-trip trades conducted by the aver-
age money manager in our sample were held for less than three 
months. Pension funds, which typically have a longer investment 
horizon, on average hold more than 18 percent of  their round-
trip trades for less than three months.3 Many of  these trades are 
held for even shorter periods. More than 7 percent of  the aver-
age money manager’s trades, and more than 5 percent of  the 
average pension fund’s trades, are held for less than one month.
3 Most defined contribution plan investments would fall under the 
“money manager” rather than “pension fund” category in the Ancerno dataset.
Exhibit 2 shows that the number of  short-term trades is not 
driven by only a few active funds, providing further insight into 
the prevalence of  short-duration trades. Of  the 1,186 funds that 
are present for five or more years, only six have no round-trip 
trades lasting less than three months. For the remaining 1,180 
funds, trades lasting less than three months account for 10 per-
cent or less of  the trading volume in 336 funds and more than 
10 percent of  trading in the other 844 funds. The prevalence of  
short-duration trades is noteworthy considering the low annual 
turnover rates reported for mutual funds and pension funds. But 
a turnover rate of  100 percent, for example, could result from a 
fund trading all of  its positions once a year, or trading half  of  its 
positions twice a year and not trading the other half  of  its posi-
tions, or from an array of  other short- and long-duration trade 
combinations. The greater the dispersion of  trade durations 
underlying a turnover rate, the less informative is the turnover 
rate about trade durations. Our dataset of  round-trip trades 
at the fund level provides an inside look at the trade durations 
behind fund turnover numbers. 
One possible explanation for so many short-term trades 
is that they are profitable. Even in a long-term portfolio, fund 
managers with investment ideas that play out over a short 
period of  time may want to engage in a short-term trades. How-
ever, Exhibit 3 shows that these short-term trades are generally 
unprofitable—so this does not explain the trading frequency.
The returns in Exhibit 3 are the percentage price changes 
in the stock over the fund’s round-trip holding period (non-
annualized in the columns to the left, annualized in the columns 
to the right).4 These returns represent the upper limit on a 
trade’s true profit, as they are based on transaction prices, which 
include the cost of  the bid-ask spread but exclude transaction 
costs such as commissions. We calculate the returns for the 
trades of  each fund in each holding period category and present 
4 Returns adjusted for stock characteristics display the same patterns. 
See: Bidisha Chakrabarty, Pamela C. Moulton, and Charles Trzcinka, “The 
Performance of  Short-term Institutional Trades,” forthcoming in the Journal 
of  Financial and Quantitative Analysis.
Exhibit 2
Percentage of share volume in trades held less than 3 months 
Nu
mb
er 
of 
Fu
nd
s
450
400
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
0%  1-10%  10-20%  20-30%  30-40%  40-50%  50-60%  60-70%  70-80%  80-90%
2
121
7
46
9206
336
257
382
6  The Center for Hospitality Research • Cornell University
15, 2006, and closed out on April 1, 2006, we calculate its 
hypothetical “what-if ” return if  it had been held from April 1, 
2006, to March 15, 2007.
The results in Exhibit 6 show that the mean and median 
trades that funds held less than three months would have pro-
duced a positive return had they been held for the remainder 
of  a year. This suggests that the negative returns on short-
duration trades are not the result of  fund managers cutting 
their losses based on new information received shortly after 
they initiate trades.
Recency bias. The combination of  negative short-term 
returns followed by higher returns if  the trades had been held 
longer is consistent with managers demonstrating recency 
bias—the situation in which a person evaluates the probabil-
ity of  events based on the ease with which relevant instances 
come to mind. Recency bias creates a tendency to overem-
phasize recent events, such as a recent large loss, and has 
been found to affect stock selection for retail investors.5 Under 
recency bias, when an investment manager observes a sharp 
fall in stock price shortly after buying a stock, he tends to over-
react and close out the position, leading to a short-duration 
trade at a loss (as in Exhibit 3), although the position would 
have produced a positive return if  it had been held longer 
(as shown in Exhibit 6). Ideally, a test for recency bias would 
examine a fund’s entire holdings to determine whether funds 
are more likely to close out trades after observing adverse price 
5 See: Hersh Shefrin, “Behavioral Finance: Biases, Mean-variance 
Returns, and Risk Premiums,” CFA Institute Conference Proceedings Quar-
terly, Vol. 31 (2007), pp. 4-12.
the mean and median fund returns for trades in each duration 
category, separately for money managers and pension funds.
The first question is whether the prevalence of  short-dura-
tion institutional trades indicates that fund managers are exploit-
ing stock information advantages. Exhibit 3 shows that the aver-
age return is significantly negative for trades held less than one 
year and significantly positive for trades held longer. This pattern 
suggests that short-term trades are not exploiting short-term in-
formation advantages. Exhibit 4 examines the incidence of  short-
term trades and Exhibit 5 examines their market-adjusted returns 
year by year. The proportion of  short-term trades remains above 
15 percent in every year, and short-term trade returns (after ad-
justing for market performance) are not significantly lower during 
the financial crisis of  2008-2009.
Potential Explanations
We examine three possible explanations for why fund managers 
engage in so much unprofitable short-term trading: the desire to 
cut losses, recency bias, and the desire to appear active in manag-
ing a fund. 
Loss-cutting. Fund managers may engage in unprofitable 
short-term trading because they want to cut their losses—revers-
ing loss-making trades early after receiving new information 
suggesting that the trades will be even more unprofitable if  held 
for longer. To examine this possibility, in Exhibit 6 we perform 
the following simulation. For each trade that is held for less than 
three months, we calculate what its return would have been if  it 
had been held for a full year (where average returns turn positive 
in Exhibit 3). For example, if  a trade was initiated on March 
Exhibit 3
Fund-level average trade returns
Un-annualized (%) Annualized (%)
Holding period Money Managers Pension Funds Money Managers Pension Funds
At least Less than Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
1 day 1 week -0.82 -0.54 -1.52 -0.54 -65.49 -43.14 -121.67 -43.11
1 week 1 month -2.06 -1.56 -3.14 -2.48 -39.54 -29.99 -60.26 -47.56
1 month 2 month -0.80 -2.36 -3.07 -2.59 -6.39 -18.85 -24.54 -20.70
2 month 3 month -2.64 -2.94 -3.37 -3.41 -12.68 -14.13 -16.19 -16.36
3 month 4 month -3.24 -3.37 -3.12 -2.82 -11.11 -11.56 -10.69 -9.68
4 month 5 month -2.85 -3.75 -2.93 -2.85 -7.61 -10.01 -7.82 -7.59
5 month 6 month -2.87 -3.30 -2.35 -2.37 -6.26 -7.21 -5.13 -5.18
6 month 9 month -1.89 -1.94 -2.11 -1.48 -3.02 -3.10 -3.38 -2.37
9 month 1 year -2.10 -1.07 -0.97 -0.56 -2.40 -1.23 -1.10 -0.64
1 year 2 years 0.14 0.41 1.27 1.79 0.10 0.28 0.85 1.19
2 years 3 years 3.66 5.36 3.19 4.73 1.47 2.14 1.27 1.89
3 years 4 years 5.93 10.31 4.06 6.87 1.70 2.94 1.16 1.96
4 years 3.18 4.59 6.76 10.03 0.67 0.97 1.42 2.11
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moves, but the Ancerno dataset contains only funds’ transac-
tions, not their entire holdings, so such an analysis is not possible 
in our sample. The pattern of  returns we observe, however, is 
consistent with recency bias.
Trading to look active. Trading simply to show that a 
portfolio manager is active should lead to more short-duration 
trades with low returns, as trades are made to justify manage-
ment fees rather than to maximize returns.6 Such trades should 
lose the bid-ask spread, but they may lose much more, especially 
if  managers trade against better-informed investors. Our find-
ings of  widespread losses in short-term trades are consistent 
with fund managers trading simply to look active. That pension 
funds have lower mean and median fund returns on short-
duration trades than money managers suggests that trading to 
6 See: James Dow and Gary Gorton, “Noise Trading, Delegated Portfo-
lio Management, and Economic Welfare,” Journal of  Political Economy, Vol. 
105 (1997), pp. 1024-1050
look active may be a larger problem for pension funds, perhaps 
because the nature of  their contracts encourages investment 
managers to trade more actively.7 
In summary, the losses on short-term trades are most 
consistent with managers trading to look active or suffering 
from recency bias, which causes them to give more weight to 
recent adverse price moves in their trading decisions. There is 
no evidence of  managers cutting their losses, nor do we find 
that investment managers are selling winners and holding onto 
losing trades (the well-known disposition effect) or exhibiting 
attribution-bias-related overconfidence (making more short-term 
trades after profitable short-term trades). Some funds do have 
profitable short-term trades, but the most profitable short-term 
traders in one period do not have profitable short-term trades 
7 See: Josef  Lakonishok, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny, “The 
Structure and Performance of  the Money Management Industry,” Brookings 
Papers: Microeconomics, (1992), 339–391
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on average in subsequent periods, suggesting a lack of  persistent 
skill in short-term trading.
Implications for Hospitality Executives
There are several ways that financial managers at hospitality 
firms can use these findings to improve their investment deci-
sions. Whether the immediate beneficiary is the firm itself  (in a 
defined benefit plan) or the firm’s employees (in a defined contri-
bution plan), the financial manager’s goal is the same: to select 
a portfolio manager or set of  portfolio managers (or funds) who 
will provide attractive returns relative to the degree of  risk they 
take on. While this study examines portfolios managed by exter-
nal managers, it may well be that internal managers suffer from 
similar poor performance in their short-term trades. The good 
news is that it is easy to get transaction-level data for a firm’s 
internally managed funds. Whether funds are internally or ex-
ternally managed, this study offers several useful implications.
First, this research highlights the importance of  ask-
ing prospective (and current) portfolio managers for detailed 
information about their trading activities. Managers with the 
same annual turnover rates may engage in dramatically dif-
ferent proportions of  short-term trades and, coupled with the 
general long-term focus of  retirement funds, the poor returns on 
short-term trades make them particularly unattractive for such 
portfolios.
Second, financial managers who monitor institutional 
portfolio managers must consider whether their actions may 
inadvertently encourage excessive short-term trading. Do “ac-
tive managers” feel pressure to conduct short-term trades just 
to show that they are indeed active? One way to counteract this 
tendency is to ask portfolio managers to report their returns by 
trade-duration category (using a standard methodology, such as 
FIFO or LIFO, to discourage creative accounting) as well as in 
the aggregate portfolio. Such transparency may help portfolio 
managers demonstrate the value of  their investment ideas and 
trading skill and highlight over what trading horizons they tend 
to add the most value. 
Third, financial managers at hospitality firms should exam-
ine the evidence on active portfolio management more broadly. 
Studies of  professional managers’ investment returns often 
fail to find evidence that active portfolio management reliably 
outperforms passive index strategies,8  while active managers 
charge much higher management fees than index funds. By con-
struction, index funds tend to hold investments for long periods, 
as it is rare for a stock to be added to and then removed from 
the same index within a three-month period. Index funds thus 
naturally avoid the trap of  “trading too much.”
The findings in this study, based on historical data, are sub-
ject to the caveat that the future may not replicate the past. It is 
possible that some institutional portfolio managers are skilled at 
short-term trading, but they are either rare in the Ancerno data-
set or they had a long run of  bad luck during the 11-year period 
of  data available to us. We note that while the sample period 
included the financial crisis of  2008-09, the finding of  negative 
returns on short-term trades is present in every year. n
8 See, for example: Robert Kosowski, Allan Timmerman, Russ Werm-
ers, and Hal White, “Can Mutual Fund “Stars” Really Pick Stocks? New 
Evidence from a Bootstrap Analysis,” Journal of Finance, Vol. 61 (2006), pp. 
2551-2595, who find that there is statistically significant evidence that only 
a very small group of  mutual funds outperform passive index strategies. See 
also: Eugene Fama and Kenneth French, 2010, “Luck versus Skill in the Cross 
Section of  Mutual Fund α Estimates,” Journal of Finance, Vol. 65 (2010), pp. 
1915–1947, who conclude that there is no such evidence.
Exhibit 6
Actual fund-level 1-year “what-if” trade returns (%)
Holding Period Money Managers Pension Funds
At least Less Than Mean Median Mean Median
1 day 1 week 16.18 12.94 8.81 3.89
1 week 1 month 33.29 11.55 16.34 6.65
1 month 2 months 39.64 21.56 16.56 4.69
2 months 3 months 19.13 8.96 22.51 4.06
 Note: The results show the mean and median trades that funds held.
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